1	GARY W. DYER				
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3	Office of United States Trustee United States Courthouse				
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5	Telephone (509) 353-2999 Fax (509) 353-3124				
6					
7	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT				
8	EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON				
9	In re:) Case No. 04-08822 PCW11				
10	THE CATHOLIC BISHOP OF) Chapter 11				
11	SPOK ANE a/k/a THE CATHOLIC) DIOCESE OF SPOKANE) UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S				
12	OBJECTION TO FEES OF ESPOSITO, GEORGE & CAMPBELL				
13	Debtor. (DOCKET NO. 415]				
14	The United States Trustee, by and through her attorney, Gary W. Dyer, objects a				
15	portion of the fees requested by the local counsel for the Committee of Tort Litigants,				
16	Esposito, George & Campbell. The United States Trustee does so for the following				
17	reasons:				
18	SUMMARY				
19	The United States Trustee objects to the amount of fees for meetings and work of				
20	multiple attorneys which do not appear justified, for having multiple attorneys at court				
21	hearings, for work which appears to be duplicative of others' work, and for entries of				
22	time which are not shown to be beneficial to this estate.				
23					
24	The firm's time record entry is not topical and makes the review of the fees				
25	impractical. While much time was spent to associate the time entries to the topical				
26	approach, the court may consider ordering the firm to resubmit the fee request in a				
27	topical approach rather than the task oriented definitions presently used.				
28					

UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO

FEES OF PACHULSKI STANG ET. AL.

A. DUAL BILLING FOR MEETINGS AND WORK

The firm bills for in the numerous meetings held by the two law firms for the Committee of Tort Litigants (CTL). See the entries as follows:

1. Case Management Order:

a.	Case A	Administ	ration	sect	ion:		

ى ر	isc Aui	1111111511	auon section.
	2/8	.5	Telephone conference between Mr. Ratajoo and Mr.
			Campbell
	2/8	.75	Mr. Campbell reviews the amended case management
			order, which duplicates the work done by the
			Pachulski firm;
	2/9	.75	Mr. Campbell reviews the CTL's case management
			order and confers with Mr. Stang;
	2/9	.75	A second review and conference lumped in with other
			tasks
	2/9	.40	In the "LA-AS" section ¹ , Mr. Campbell has a
			talanhana conference with Mr. Stang in the case

2/9	.40	In the "LA-AS" section, Mr. Campbell has a
		telephone conference with Mr. Stang in the case
		management order
2/10	40	Mr. Campbell reviews the U.S. Trustee's objection

2/10	.40	Mr. Campbell reviews the U.S. Trustee's objection to
		the case management order, which duplicates the
		work of the Pachulski firm;

2/11	.25	Mr. Campbell reviews the responses and the
		committee's response, which duplicates the Pachulski
		firms's work;

2/11	.50	Mr. Campbell reviews the response from Mr. Conklin,
		which duplicates the Pachulski firm's work;

2/11	.33	Mr. Campbell confers with an unnamed attorney
		regarding the case management order

2/11	1.2	In the "LA-AS" section Mr. Campbell participated in
		a general session with Mr. Stang which includes the
		subject matter of the case management order

2/12	.75	Mr. Campbell reviewed the CMO and responses
		(again)

In the "BA-OCM" section, Mr. Campbell reviewed 2/14 1.2 the CMO and responses (again);

¹/₂ The time entries which mention the case management order or the "CMO" are in different sections

of the fee application. This is true for other areas of work as well.

1		2/23	.75	Mr. Campbell reviewed the CMO and signed it
2			.33	Mr. Campbell telephoned Mr. Stang about the CMO
3			.2 1.33	Mr. Campbell telephoned Mr. Stang about the CMO In the "BA-OCM" section, Mr. Campbell reviewed
4		_,	1,00	the CMO responses and strategy, but does not identify the persons present at this meeting; Mr. Stang's
5				corresponding entry does identify other parties at the meeting;
6		2/24	.6	Mr. Campbell reviewed the order
7		2/24	.9	In the "LA-AS" section, Mr. Campbell conferred with
8		3/2	.75	Mr. Stang regarding the CMO issues In the "GA-RA" section, review of rough draft of
		3/2	.13	CMO
9		3/3	.93	2 entries re: review email comments re CMO;
10				telephone call to debtor's counsel; review of the latest CMO
11		3/4	.6	review of CMO and itinerary
12		3/4	.15	In the "GA-COE" section, review of emails re
1.2				changes to CMO
13		3/4	1	In the "BA-AS" section, a strategy meeting with Mr.
14		3/4	.75	Stang re CMO In the "GA-RA" section, review of "proposed final.
15		3/4	.13	Redline version of CMO"
		3/8	.5	In the "GA-RA" section, review of final CMO and
16				signature
17	The a	nnlicant snent	16 57	hours and hilled \$3 897
18	The applicant spent 16.57 hours and billed \$3,897.			
19	2 Cr	editors Comm	ittee M	leetings
20	2. Ci	carrors comm	11000 14	
21		a. The entrie	es do n	ot identify the parties present at the meetings or on the
22	telephone.	See the entric	es for:	
23		2/12 1.4 hc	nirs	
24		2/12 1.4 no 2/22 1	. 41 0	
		3/8 1.25		
25		3/15 .5 3/22 1.25		
26		3/29 1		
27		4/5 1		

Because the Pachulski firm's fee application indicates Mr. Stang and Mr. Ratajoo attend some meetings, more than one attorney was present at these meetings without any reason or justification given in either fee application. The fees should be denied in their entirety.

3. Strong Arm Powers motion:

In the "GA-DR" section, Mr. Campbell drafted the first version of the motion to assert strong arm powers, which we believe to be the motion regarding the assignment of avoidance powers as described in the Pachulski firm's fee application. On 2/8, Mr. Campbell drafted the motion billing half an hour (.5); then as noted in section "LT-P" section, he reviewed it on 2/9 billing .25 of an hour; and in the "LA-AS" section, on 2/11, he was in a general session on the case which included the avoidance motion billing 1.2 hours. The Pachulski firm began work on the motion for assignment of the avoidance powers on 2/11. In the "LA-AS" section, Mr. Campbell on 2/15, conferred with Mr. Stang regarding the CMO and avoidance matters billing .75 hours.

In March the same scattering of entries adds the "GA-RA" section with:

- 3/14 .5 review of motion to pursue avoidance powers
 - .75 Review debtor's reply to motion
- 3/21 .5 review of debtor's reply to CTC regarding the avoidance actions
- 3/23 .5 meeting with Mr. Stang re numerous issues" pending employment hearing assignment of 544 actions"

The applicant spent 4.95 hours and billed \$1,113.75.

4. Mr. Campbell also spent time related to the remand issues, which are found in

the "LA-AS' section on 2/10 for 1.75 hours of legal research and on 2/11 for .1 hours in a telephone call about the legal research. The remand issues were duties of Mr. Jackson for all the tort litigants. The applicant spent 1.85 hours and billed \$416.25.

- 5. In the "541" subject matter, which the Pachulski firm refers to as the Declaratory Relief matter, Mr. Campbell, in the "Research Litigation" section, on 2/11 spent 1.2 hours in researching the core vs. non core issues, and then in the "LA-AS" section, conferred with Mr. Stang on 2/15 and 2/18 for .75 each time. The same tasks were done by the Pachulski firm. There is no need for local counsel to duplicate the work of Pachulski Stang's firm and the fees should be denied in their entirety. The applicant spent 2.7 hours and billed \$607.50.
 - 6. Lawyer time to talk to clerk's office or chamber's staff:

There is no reasonable basis for paying counsel to call the court staff for hearing dates or to follow up on orders. Clerical staff should be doing this task.

A. See the entries of "BA-CA" section:

```
3/16 2.07 (5 different entries)
3/22 .20
3/23 .73 (two entries)
3/24 .50 (two entries)
3/29 .20
3/30 .20
```

In the "BA-FE" section, the similar entries are:

3/29 .60

3/30 .25

In the "GA-COE" section, a similar entries are:

3/14 .20

4/4 .5

The applicant spent 5.25 hours and billed \$1181.50. These fees should be denied in their entirety.

7. Intervention matters:

a. The intervention matters are for two different adversary proceedings. First, the intervention sought by the Claimant's Committee (CTC) in the 541 adversary and second, the intervention by the Litigant's Committee in the Pacific Insurance adversary proceeding. The fee application does not cleanly segregate the two adversary proceedings nor the subject matter. Entries related to these two adversary proceedings cross into virtually every fee category and the descriptions of the subject matter do not clearly distinguish in which one it belongs.

"GA-R"	3/10	.75	research regarding intervention
"GA-COE"	3/14	.2	Telephone call to case administrator regarding
			intervention.
"GA-RA"	3/15	.6	review of motion to intervene (cannot tell
			whose motion this is)
"GA-RA"	3/16	.8	review CTL's motion to intervene in
			declaratory relief action
"GA-COC"	3/16	.4	Telephone call with Joe Schickish re
			intervention
"LA-AS"	3/16	.75	review of all intervention documents of CTC
"GA-RA"	3/17	.6	review the first draft of notice and order re

UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO FEES OF PACHULSKI STANG ET. AL.

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1				intervene	
2	"GA-RA"		1.1	review CTC motion	
3	"BA-CA" "GA-COC"		.5 .5	Review of all intervention documents Telephone call with Stang about procedural	
4	G/1 000	3/21		status of motion to intervene in light of the withdrawal of reference	
5	"LA-AS"	3/21	.75	telephone call with Mr. Stang re CTC theory on intervention	
6	"GA-COC"	3/22	.25	Telephone call with Shaun Cross re	
7				intervention	
8					
9	It is very difficult to	asses	s the va	alue and the subject matter of the time entries	
10	when they are spread throu	ighout	the car	tegories of this fee application and to even	
11	identify the true subject matter. It is also impossible to ensure a correct evaluation of				
12	duplicative time between the Pachulski firm and this firm's time. The applicant spent				
13					
14	6.7 hours and billed \$1,50°	7.50. T	The tim	ne should be disallowed in its entirety.	
15					
16	8 Lack of subject t	matter	descri	otions:	
17	8. Lack of subject matter descriptions: In several entries, the lack of a subject matter makes the review of the time entry				
18					
19	impossible. The lack of a subject matter category for the different types of litigation				
20	events in the case adds to t	he diff	iculty	of the review.	
21	See the entries of "	GA -CO	OC" se	ection for the dates of 3/21 (.1) and 3/28 (.3)	
22	See the entries of	G/1 C	oe 5 e	etion for the dates of 3/21 (.1) and 3/20 (.3)	
23	where the telephone call ha	as no s	ubject	matter.	
24	See section "GA-R	A" for	entries	dated 3/4 (.75) and 3/17 (.5). Further, on 3/8 in	
25	an entry related to a .6 of a	ın hour	to "de	etail review of complaint" but which complaint?	
26	On the same day is a .9 of an hour to "review of answer to complaint" but which				
27	1 :				

complaint?

In section "GA-PP," the entry of 3/10 (.75) refers to a review of answer and notes in preparation for planning meeting, but no subject matter of what answer or meeting.

In these examples, the applicant spent 3.9 hours and billed \$877.50. These fees should be denied in their entirety.

9. Rule 26 matters

The applicant was involved in the Rule 26 disclosures for at least one adversary proceeding. The Pachulski firm, as noted in their fee application, was the main author and driving force. The entries for this firm in sections "GA-DR" are:

3/14 .75 3/15 .6 3/21 .9 3/23 .75 3/29 .33 .25 .33 3/31 .5 .33 6 4/4

In entries in both "GA- PP" for 1.2 hours and in "GA-R" on 3/15 for .75 hours, 3.23 for .4 of an hour, and 4/1 for .3 of an hour) (we cannot tell why this entry was in this section), the description does not demonstrate why they should be compensated for the same work. Other entries are in "LA-AS" section for 2.25 hours spent strategy meetings on 3/10, and 1.1 hours spent on 3.29 also do not demonstrate the need for this applicant's participation.

The applicant spent 11.34 hours and billed \$2,551.50. These tasks were done by

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the Pachulski Stang firm and this applicant's duplicative services should not be allowed.

10. Review of Portland pleadings:

In section "GA-RA", the 3/7 entry for .75 hours for the review of the Portland pleading re sue the Parishes (sic) separately" has no context nor any need for this counsel to review that pleading. The Pachulski firm was the author and driving force on the complaint to determine what the property of the estate was. The location of this time entry is this category simply out of context as well.

B. DUPLICATIVE TIME BETWEEN THE TWO FIRMS

The two firms did not work together to share their work, their interests or their efforts. The jumbled categorization of the firm's time entries makes the comparison with the Pachulski firm's fee application very difficult. It appears the following can be gleaned form the two fee applications although they do not necessarily parse:

Date/ Pachulski Subject	Description	Lawyer and time/ Campbell's category
2/8 L430	case management	HRR .5 JWC
2/11 L430	avoidance motion	HRR .5 JWC

1 2	2/16	L430	avoidance motion	JIS 1 JWC
3	2/18	L430	committee formation	JIS .7 JWC
5	2/14	L430	case management order	JIS JWC
6 7 8	3/10	Dec Relief	conference call re declaratory relief	JIS 1.2 plus 2.5 HED 2.6 JWC 2.25 plus 1.5 (in LA-AS)
9 10	3/11	Dec Relief	telephone call re meet and confer, Rule 26	HED JC
11	3/15	L430	intervention	JIS .3 JWC
1213	3/15	Dec Relief	Office conference; telephone call with JWC	JIS .6 HED 1.5
14 15	3/21	Dec Relief	CTC intervention/strategy meeting	JIS .70 JRF .60 JWC .75 (in LA-AS
1617	3/23	L430	discovery, Rule 26	HED .4 JWC
18				

It may be possible to guess at the missing time entries of Mr. Campbell to compare to the time of the Pachulski firm. However, it is the duty and burden of the applicant to provide the clear information for the evaluation under section 330.

ARGUMENT

1. THE LAW RELATED TO FEE APPLICATIONS.

1	The burden of proof for each entry of a fee application is on the applicant. <u>In re</u>			
2 3	Manoa Fin. Co., 853 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Recycling Industries, Inc., 243			
4	B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000). This burden is not to be taken lightly, especially given			
5	the fact that every dollar expended on fees results in a dollar less for distribution to			
6	creditors of the estate. <u>In re Yankton College</u> , 101 B.R. 151, 158 (Bankr.S.D.1989); <u>In</u>			
7 8	<u>re Pettibone Corp.</u> , 74 B.R. 293, 305 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1987).			
9	The applicant is required to provide the court with a sufficiently detailed			
10	application. <u>In re Nucorp Energy Inc.</u> , 764 F.2d 655, 658 (9 th Cir. 1985).			
11	Professionals have an obligation to exercise billing judgment. <u>Unsecured</u>			
12 13	Creditors' Committee v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 924 F.2d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1991);			
14	<u>In re Auto Parts Club, Inc.</u> 211 B.R. 29, 33 -34 (9th Cir.BAP (Cal.),1997).			
15	Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the court, after notice and a			
16	hearing, to award to a trustee, an examiner, or other professional person employed under			
17	11 U.S.C. § 327 or 1103			
18 19				
20	(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional			
21	person employed by any such person; and			
22	(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.			
23	The court is has discretion to award less than the amount of compensation requested. 11			
2425	U.S.C. § 330(a)(2).			
26	Section 330(a)(3) provides:			
27	In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded, the court			

shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into

- 11 -

1	account all relevant factors, including -
2	(A) the time spent on such services;
3	(B) the rates charged for such services;
4 5	(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;
3	(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of
6	time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the
7	problem, issue, or task addressed; and (E) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary
8	compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other
9	than cases under this title.
10	Section 330(a)(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code establishes limitations on the award of
11	compensation:
12	
13	Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow compensation for -
14	(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
	(ii) services that were not—
15	(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or (II) necessary to the administration of the case.
16	(11) necessary to the administration of the ease.
17	These guidelines grew out of court decisions beginning with Johnson v. Georgia
18	Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The Johnson factors assist in
19	determining the initial "reasonable" hourly rate, as well as the final adjustments to the
20	determining the initial reasonable hourly late, as well as the linar adjustments to the
21	lodestar. See, In re Manoa Fin. Co., 853 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, so
22	long as the rates being charged are the applicant's normal rates charged in bankruptcy or
23	non-bankruptcy matters alike, they will be afforded a presumption of reasonableness."
24	
25	In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 787, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (citations omitted). As the
26	rate must be reasonable "so must the time spent by the professionals on the various tasks
27	to be performed." <u>Id</u> . Indeed,
28	

We review fee applications paying particular attention to the level of professional . . . billing time viz-a-viz the complexity of the task being performed. The nature, extent and complexity of the task . . . determines the level of professional . . . who should perform the task, and, consequently, the reasonableness of the fees charged . . . It is unreasonable for a senior attorney to perform routine tasks such as preparing a debtor's schedules Consequently, fees charged at a senior attorney's hourly rate for such services are unreasonable. <u>Id.</u> at 796-97 (citation omitted).

The entries noted above in this objection are not shown to be reasonable nor necessary to this case. The double billing of meetings, the aggressive motion for the assignment of the avoidance actions, the unexplained entries related to other cases or other non-debtor dioceses are not compensable under the principles of reasonableness or necessity.

2. DUAL BILLING FOR MEETINGS AND REVIEW OF PLEADINGS MUST BE JUSTIFIED OR OTHERWISE BE DENIED.

Where multiple attorneys attend a hearing or conference, the applicant needs to show a contribution to the hearings or conference to allow compensation. Microwave Products of America, Inc. 102 B.R. 661 (Bankry., W.D.Tn. 1989); Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc., 69 B.R. 471, 16 CBC2d (Bankry. S.D. Ind. 1987). Only one attorney may charge for a conference where no adequate explanation is given. In re Adventist Living Centers, Inc. 137 B.R. 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). Attorneys should work independently without the incessant conferencing. In re Pettibone Corp., 74 B.R. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ill 1987).

The multiple meetings and conferences do not describe their necessity. The

narrative for the fee application does not describe their necessity or their effectiveness.

Further, the dual billing is also between the two law firms for the single Committee of Tort Litigants. It should not be allowed.

3. INCOMPLETE TIME RECORDS MERIT A DENIAL OF FEES.

Where time entries lack the subject matter or substance of the event, the fees may be denied. Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc., 69 B.R. 471, 16 CBC2d (Bankry. S.D. Ind. 1987). In re Pettibone Corp., 74 B.R. 293 (Bankr. N.D. III 1987).

The time records that fail to show the relevance, leaving the reviewer to guess, are insufficient in their description. The time entries for the review of the Portland and Tucson cases are not shown to be beneficial or relevant to this case and all time should be disallowed in their entirety.

4. COURT MAY REDUCE FEES FOR DUPLICATION OF SERVICES IN THE CASE BY OTHER COUNSEL

The curt may reduce the fees of counsel for time that is duplicative of services performed by other counsel in the case. See, Matter of First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Casey, 173 B.R. 893 (Bankr. E.D. Tx. 1994); In re Liberal Market, 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).

The work of the two firms for the CTL are duplicative of each other. At the time of the employment of the two firms, the court warned counsel of the need to avoid duplication. They have not heeded the warning. Nor have they presented a coherent fee

application to demonstrate they avoided duplication or used good billing judgment. **CONCLUSION** The court is respectfully requested to find that the fee application does not comply with the required form as it does not provide the topical summary of tasks done in a coherent fashion, and that fees requested by counsel in the case are not reasonable, and to reduce the fee by \$15,000, and for such other relief as may be appropriate. Dated this 3rd_day of October 2005. Respectfully submitted, ILENE J. LASHINSKY United States Trustee /S/ Gary W. Dyer GARY W. DYER Attorney for the United States Trustee