

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.
Cathy L. Reece (No. 005932)
Nicolas B. Hoskins (No. 023277)
3003 North Central Avenue
Suite 2600
Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2913
Telephone: (602) 916-5000
Facsimile: (602) 916-5999
Email: creece@fclaw.com
nhoskins@fclaw.com

BROWN RUDNICK LLP
William R. Baldiga (MA Bar No. 542125)
Cheryl B. Pinarchick (MA Bar No. 636208)
One Financial Center
Boston, Massachusetts 02111
Telephone: (617) 856-8200
Facsimile: (617) 289-0420
Email: wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com
cpinarchick@brownrudnick.com

Attorneys for the City of Glendale, Arizona

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In re:
DEWEY RANCH HOCKEY, LLC,
COYOTES HOLDINGS, LLC,
COYOTES HOCKEY, LLC and
ARENA MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC,
Debtors.

Case No. 2:09-bk-09488-RTBP
(Jointly Administered)

Chapter 11

**REPLY TO GLENDALE SALE
OBJECTIONS AND SUMMARY OF
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
(FILED UNDER SEAL)**

This filing applies to:
☒ All Debtors
☐ Specified Debtors

Hearing Date: August 3 and 5, 2009
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.
Hearing Location: 230 N. First Ave.
Courtroom 703
Phoenix, Arizona

The City of Glendale, Arizona ("Glendale") respectfully submits this reply ("Reply") to the several objections and other oppositions filed to the sale of certain assets of these estates in the manner styled in these cases as the "Glendale Sale," and further provides this Court with a summary of certain highly relevant evidence learned through

1 the discovery recently conducted in these cases. This Reply is based upon the following
2 points and authorities, the accompanying Declaration of Edward Beasley, the pleadings,
3 papers and other records on file in these cases, and such argument and further evidence
4 presented to the Court at the time of the hearing.

5 **I.**

6 **INTRODUCTION**

7 As this Court knows, these cases have been dominated by heated litigation from
8 literally their first day as to the proper manner for selling the operating assets of these
9 Debtors. The National Hockey League (“NHL”), Glendale, other creditors, and indeed
10 the integrity of the conduct of these cases, are in desperate need of relief from the
11 litigation onslaught and misconduct brought on by Mr. Moyes and his representatives, and
12 in place thereof for this Court to impose a transparent and fair sale process carried out
13 without the continued oppression by Mr. Moyes.

14 The Debtors commenced these cases with laser-like focus on the urgent sale of the
15 operating assets (the “Operating Assets”) to PSE Sports & Entertainment, L.P. (“PSE”),
16 an entity formed by Mr. James Balsillie for the purpose of moving the Phoenix Coyotes
17 NHL franchise (the “Team”) to Hamilton, Ontario. Virtually every deadline imposed in
18 these cases has been in an effort to accommodate that stated purpose under PSE’s threats
19 to withdraw its bid, notwithstanding the repeated caution of the NHL that Mr. Balsillie’s
20 prior conduct made his eligibility for ownership anything but certain, and that the Team
21 could not be moved from Glendale for the upcoming 2009-2010 season in any event.
22 Glendale has also strenuously objected to the Debtors’ threatened rejection of its Use
23 Agreement with Glendale for the benefit of the Debtors’ primary owner, Mr. Jerry Moyes,
24 knowing the tremendous damage that would be caused to the taxpayers of Glendale by
25 such rejection.

26 On the severely constrained schedule dictated by PSE, the NHL and Glendale have

1 scrambled to identify, qualify and finalize tremendously complex arrangements for the
2 acquisition of the Operating Assets. These efforts have been under the most trying of
3 circumstances: timeframes compressed beyond anything previously attempted (to
4 Glendale's knowledge) for the sale of an NHL franchise; no support from the Debtors of
5 any type; the threat, and then the reality, of litigation by other parties seeking to derail the
6 ability of Glendale to finalize arrangements with potential buyers; the constant (and
7 extremely public and well-financed) drum-beat by Mr. Balsillie that he will spare no
8 expense to move the Team to Ontario, designed to cast doubt on the Glendale Sale that the
9 NHL has tried to conduct; the threat of interrogation of anyone who ventured to make a
10 bid, and then the carrying out of those threats under the gussied-up pretense of "collusion"
11 among bidders that still today has no demonstrated basis in fact; and, most recently, the
12 exceptionally harmful and inexcusable public disclosure of the most delicate and
13 confidential negotiation details by Mr. Moyes, with the effect of chilling or completely
14 derailing the very Glendale Sale that he has made every effort to prevent.

15 The NHL has now determined, in accordance with its Constitution, that Mr.
16 Balsillie lacks the integrity to become an NHL owner of this franchise (wherever located).
17 There are no more false deadlines imposed by PSE.

18 The most recent misconduct by Mr. Moyes, which has at least severely chilled the
19 competitive Glendale Sale process that he opposes, is set forth in more detail in the
20 Application for Issuance of an Order to Show Cause filed herewith by Glendale.
21 However, and as unfortunate as that conduct is in and of itself, it is even more egregious
22 in the context of the pattern of inappropriate conduct by Mr. Moyes. That pattern started
23 the very day he purchased the controlling interest in the Team on September 27, 2006. It
24 continued through the days just prior to the commencement of these cases with the
25 [REDACTED] and is
26 continuing further in connection with Mr. Moyes's attempted administration of these

1 cases for his personal benefit and at the expense of creditors holding legitimate claims
2 against these estates. The actual facts as to this pattern of conduct, while still being
3 revealed through on-going discovery, are inconsistent with the facts and stories previously
4 provided to this Court, and the summary of what has been discovered to date under the
5 compunction of legal process is necessary to understand the context of this most recent
6 misconduct.

7 **II.**

8 **STATEMENT OF RECENTLY DISCOVERED FACTS**
9 **REGARDING MR. MOYES'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEBTORS**
10 **AND THE CONDUCT OF THESE CASES**

11 [REDACTED]
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25 ¹ The relevant pages of the transcript of Mr. Shumway's July 30, 2009 examination
26 ("Shumway Tr.") are attached hereto as Exhibit A.

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² The relevant pages of the transcript of Mr. Moyes's July 31, 2009 examination ("Moyes Tr.") are attached hereto as Exhibit B.

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³ The relevant pages of the transcript of Mr. Nealy’s July 29, 2009 examination (“Nealy Tr.”) are attached hereto as Exhibit C.

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Second, and while Glendale is not privy to the details of allegations that have been communicated to it informally (as Glendale is not intimately involved with the day-to-day aspects of any bidders' due diligence or the administration of the sale process), Glendale has been informed that the potential bidder most disfavored by Mr. Moyes, the Reinsdorf Group, has been especially frustrated in obtaining access to the sale data room, timely access to senior management and delays in obtaining the Debtors' comment on draft sale

1 documents.

2 Third, for several weeks the Debtors threatened discovery against all potential
3 bidders (other than of PSE, of course), a threat made immediately after (specifically,
4 within a matter of 20 hours) the filing of discovery requests by Glendale against Mr.
5 Moyes. The Debtors and Mr. Moyes jointly then carried out the threatened discovery
6 under the banner of suspected “collusion,” and even now have not provided a hint of proof
7 as to a single supposed collusive act. That discovery has, however, taken its intended toll
8 by distracting all parties and adding additional cost and public scrutiny to what should be
9 an orderly sale process. It is extraordinary for the supposed fiduciary debtor-in-
10 possession to seek discovery as to a potential bidder at all; it is incredible that that
11 supposed fiduciary presently intends to take the examination of a potential bidder literally
12 the day before the scheduled auction date in Reno, Nevada.

13 Mr. Moyes has also failed to comply with this Court’s discovery orders. Despite
14 the fact that Glendale’s discovery requests were filed on July 1, 2009, and were so ordered
15 by this Court on July 16, 2009, to this day Mr. Moyes has failed to produce virtually any
16 of Mr. Moyes’s e-mails, and has failed to even conduct a good faith effort to comply. The
17 limited search for Mr. Moyes’s e-mails was done by using search terms that would have
18 failed to pick up, for example, e-mails that would have referenced words such as
19 “hockey,” “Scudder,” “Glendale,” “NHL,” or “Coyotes.” Glendale is mindful that the
20 Court has little patience for discovery disputes and the proper remedy for this failure can
21 be addressed in due time. Glendale feels compelled, however, to bring this further
22 misconduct to the Court’s attention given that Mr. Moyes’s failures have greatly impaired
23 Glendale’s ability to effectively prepare for hearings occurring on almost a daily basis.
24 Glendale is also mindful that such failures may contribute to its inability to be more
25 precise as to some of the allegations made herein. Glendale must therefore reserve its
26 opportunity to more fully address these issues and correct any misimpressions that could

1 have been addressed earlier if only Mr. Moyes had made any genuine effort to comply
2 with this Court's discovery orders. These failures are, unfortunately, consistent with Mr.
3 Moyes's other conduct in these cases.

4 Next, the Debtors failed to notice out the Glendale Sale. Glendale is prepared to
5 chalk up that failure to the admitted inadvertence of counsel.

6 What cannot be inadvertence, no matter how charitably interpreted, is the
7 intentional violation by Mr. Moyes of the confidentiality order that has occupied hour
8 upon hour of courtroom time and difficult negotiation. Indeed, the confidential
9 information that was disclosed were exactly those facts which were specifically known to
10 Mr. Moyes and his counsel to be most damaging to the integrity of this process and the
11 ability of Glendale to fashion one or more agreements that would enable it to have a fair
12 opportunity to keep the Team in Glendale. If there were any integrity in the Moyes-
13 directed process before that misconduct, there certainly cannot be now.

14 III.

15 ARGUMENT

16 These cases involve significant sums of money; important taxpayer and
17 commercial interests; complex legal relationships; and tremendous public attention. In
18 that context, the integrity of the process is first and foremost.

19 Here, in the context of a section 363 sale of valuable assets, "the interests of
20 creditors is said to be of 'paramount' importance and entitled to deference." In re
21 Lahijani, 325 B.R. 282, 290 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); In re Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 801 (B.A.P.
22 9th Cir. 1982).

23 Integrity of the process, in the first instance, is the primary responsibility of the
24 debtors-in-possession. "The doctrine that a chapter 11 debtor in possession owes a
25 fiduciary duty to all creditors of the estate is presumably universal." In re Battinelli, 169
26 B.R. 522, 524-25 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing In re Devers, 759 F.2d 751, 754 (9th

1 Cir.1985)). See also In re Hampton Hotel Investors, L.P., 270 B.R. 346, 361-62 (Bankr.
2 S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a debtor in
3 possession, like a chapter 11 trustee, owes the estate and its creditors a general duty of
4 loyalty.” (citing Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649 (1963))).

5 “By virtue of section 1107(a), a chapter 11 debtor in possession stands in the shoes
6 of a trustee and is a fiduciary for the estate and its creditors.” In re Count Liberty, LLC,
7 370 B.R. 259, 275 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Thompson v. Margen (In re
8 McConville), 110 F.3d 47, 50 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that chapter 11 debtors in
9 possession “were fiduciaries of their own estate owing a duty of care and loyalty to the
10 estate’s creditors”). As a fiduciary, a corporate officer is not free to manage chapter 11
11 process in his or her own self interest, but rather must administer in trust for the benefit of
12 creditors. See In re Anchorage Nautical Tours, Inc., 145 B.R. 637, 643 (B.A.P. 9th
13 Cir.1992) (citing In re Woodson, 839 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1988)).

14 Glendale respectfully submits that Mr. Moyes does not appreciate these principles.
15 But appreciation is required, not elective. “One of the painful facts of bankruptcy is that
16 the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors.”
17 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985). “It is
18 true that a debtor in possession owes a fiduciary duty to both creditors and equity holders.
19 ... This does not allow a debtor in possession to favor equity holders over creditors,
20 however, or to engage in conduct that essentially amounts to concealing assets and self-
21 dealing. To the contrary, the hierarchy of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the interests
22 of creditors are paramount to the interests of the equity holders, and a trustee must act in
23 accordance with this hierarchy.” Tenn-Fla Partners v. First Union Nat. Bank of Fla., 229
24 B.R. 720, 736 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (citations omitted).

25 Here, these Debtors have been insolvent from the moment Mr. Moyes took control
26 of the Team in 2006, and Mr. Moyes seems to have rarely missed an opportunity to look

1 out for himself at the expense of third party creditors. The privilege of having the tiller of
2 the chapter 11 ship, especially in a conceded sale case, is not without bounds. “[T]he
3 willingness of courts to leave debtors in possession is premised upon an assurance that the
4 officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out the fiduciary
5 responsibilities of a trustee.” Commodity Futures Trading, 471 U.S. at 355. Bankruptcy
6 courts have routinely revoked the privilege of principals who put their own interests
7 before those of creditors in much less egregious situations, and where the pattern of
8 conduct has been much less pervasive. See e.g., In re Embrace Sys. Corp., 178 B.R. 112
9 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995) (a bidder’s offer was found unfair and the sale was not in the
10 best interests of creditors because the sale had been arranged by the debtor’s president,
11 who had a financial interest in the bidder); In re Wingspread Corp., 92 B.R. 87 (Bankr.
12 S.D.N.Y. 1988) (chairman failed to list certain information on the schedules in an effort to
13 personally capitalize on the section 363 sale of debtors’ assets through a corporate vehicle
14 that was purchasing the debtors’ assets; accordingly, the court granted an injunction to
15 preserve the status quo and allow the court the opportunity to consider whether the sale
16 process was permeated by insider misconduct); In re Plabell Rubber Products, Inc., 149
17 B.R. 475, 479-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (debtor’s vice president, involved in soliciting
18 and running the sale, testified that he would not discuss his employment with the debtor,
19 which caused the court concern because such discussions would bear upon the integrity of
20 the proposed sale).

21 IV.

22 CONCLUSION

23 In its Application for Order to Show Cause filed herewith, the City of Glendale has
24 suggested forms of relief that, while not sufficient to compensate Glendale and other
25 creditors for the harm caused by Mr. Moyes and those reporting to him, would mitigate
26 harm going forward and restore some sense of integrity to the sale process proposed to be

1 conducted in this Court. The City of Glendale respectfully requests that such relief be
2 entered without delay, and that the taxpayers of the City of Glendale be afforded a fair
3 opportunity to retain an important civic asset, and to avoid material and irreparable harm,
4 on something approaching a level playing field with due process of law.

5
6 Dated: August 3, 2009

7 FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

8
9 By: /s/ Cathy L. Reece
10 Cathy L. Reece (No. 005932)
11 Nicolas B. Hoskins (No. 023277)
12 3003 N. Central Ave. Suite 2600
13 Phoenix, AZ 85012-2913
14 Telephone: (602) 916-5343
15 Facsimile: (602) 916-5543

16 -and-

17 BROWN RUDNICK LLP
18 William R. Baldiga
19 Cheryl B. Pinarchick
20 One Financial Center
21 Boston, MA 02111
22 Telephone: (617) 856-8200
23 Facsimile: (617) 856-8201

24 *Counsel for the City of Glendale, Arizona*

25 This document was filed under seal with
26 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court on this
3rd day of August, 2009.

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1 COPY of the foregoing emailed the same day to:

2 Thomas J. Salerno, Esq.
3 Jordan A. Kroop, Esq.
4 Kelly Singer, Esq.
5 SQUIRE SANDERS & DEMPSEY LLP
6 40 North Central Avenue, Suite 2700
7 Phoenix Arizona 85004-4498
8 tsalerno@ssd.com
9 jkroop@ssd.com
10 ksinger@ssd.com
11 Attorneys for Debtors

12 Edward Zachary
13 BRYAN CAVE
14 2. N. Central Ave., Suite 2200
15 Phoenix, AZ 85004
16 Edward.zachary@bryancave.com

17 C. Taylor Ashworth, 010143
18 Alan A. Meda, 009213
19 STINSON MORRISON HECKER LLP
20 1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100
21 Phoenix, Arizona 85004
22 tashworth@stinson.com
23 ameda@stinson.com

24 J. Gregory Milmoe
25 Shepard Goldfein
26 SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
4 Times Square
New York, New York 10036
gregory.milmoe@skadden.com
shepard.goldfein@skadden.com

Anthony W. Clark
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
One Rodney Square
Wilmington, Delaware 19899
anthony.clark@skadden.com
Attorneys for National Hockey League

Carolyn J. Johnsen, Esq.
Peter W. Sorensen, Esq.
Kerry Hodges
JENNINGS STROUSS & SALMON PLC
201E Washington St
Phoenix AZ 85004-2385
cjjohnsen@jsslaw.com
psorensen@jsslaw.com
Attorneys for Jerry Moyes

1 Thomas Allen, Esq.
Paul Sala, Esq.
2 ALLEN SALA & BAYNEPLC
1850 N Central Ave #1150
3 Phoenix AZ 85004
psala@asbazlaw.com
4 tallen@asbazlaw.com
Attorneys for the Official Joint Committee of Unsecured Creditors
5

6 /s/ Susan Stanczak-Ingram
7
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