1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK			
2	SOUTH	ERN DISTRICT OF 1	NEW YORK	
3			X	
4	In re:		: Case No. 04-13638	
5	RCN CORPORATION, et al,			
6			: One Bowling Green : New York, NY	
7	Reorganized Debtors.		: December 16, 2005 X	
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER (a) CLARIFYING CERTAIN TERMS OF CONFIRMATION ORDER OR, (b) IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MODIFYING CERTAIN TERMS OF CONFIRMATION ORDER PURSUANT TO FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) AND FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024			
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12	BEFORE THE	HONORABLE ROBERT TATES BANKRUPTCY	D. DRAIN	
13				
14	APPEARANCES:			
15	For the Reorganized	SUSHEEL KIRPALAN	IT. ESO	
16	Debtors:		HADLEY & MC CLOY, LLP	
17		New York, New Yo		
18	For Mega Cable: Exchange:	JAY TEITELBAUM, WENDY S. WALKER,		
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	Proceedings recorded by transcript produced by t			

THE COURT: Where are you all on this matter? The
 last time we were set, it looked like it might be resolved.
 MR. KIRPALANI: Yes, Your Honor. Susheel Kirpalani

4 from Milbank Tweed on behalf reorganized RCN Corp.

5 I know the last time we were here, my partner, Dennis 6 Dunne reported to the Court that they believed there was an 7 agreement in principle and the parties were working towards 8 finalizing that, and as a placeholder, they would set to date 9 as -- in the next hearing to resolve threshold issues to the 10 extent necessary.

11 A couple of days ago, my colleague, Lena Mandel here 12 had a call with chambers along with Mr. Teitelbaum to discuss 13 whether an adjournment might be warranted because the parties 14 continue to discuss. I understand Mega Cable's position as of 15 right now is that they are not discussing continuing 16 settlements, but you know, there is just something still being 17 discussed, but in terms of Mega Cable's agreement to adjourn as 18 opposed to go forward, I think the preference is that they 19 would go forward.

20 So that's where we are.

21 THE COURT: Is that right?

22 MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, as far as --

THE COURT: You've got to state just for the record,
because we're on the --

25 MR. TEITELBAUM: I'm sorry --

THE COURT: -- recording system.

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2 MR. TEITELBAUM: Jay Teitelbaum, Morgan, Lewis &
3 Bockius. I'm here with my partner, Wendy Walker on behalf of
4 Mega Cable, MCM Holding and the majority shareholders.

5 Your Honor, without getting into the substance of any 6 settlement discussions which I don't believe would be 7 appropriate --

THE COURT: No, I don't want to hear those.

9 MR. TEITELBAUM: -- I think it's fair to say that 10 unfortunately discussions broke down to the point that the 11 parties don't have an agreement.

12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I think Mr. 13 Kirpalani is right. The way I had left it is there were 14 threshold jurisdictional and abstention issues that Mega Cable 15 had raised, and before going into discovery, it seemed to me to 16 deal with those.

MR. TEITELBAUM: Yeah, I think that's absolutely right, Your Honor. We had requested that that be the approach that Your Honor take, and I believe that's why we're here today.

21 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

22 MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, Your Honor.

As noted, we are here today on reorganized RCN Corporation's motion for entry of an order clarifying certain terms of the confirmation order, or in the alternative,

1 modifying certain terms of the confirmation order pursuant to
2 Rule 60(b).

This is the second court date on our motion at the first hearing, which was in the nature of a status conference. As we just covered, the parties indicated that we would use today as the holdover date for threshold issues.

7 The two threshold issues that we understand the Court 8 asked us to address were, one, whether the dispute was ripe 9 because it appeared initially premised upon mere concerns by 10 RCN rather than a concrete dispute that had arisen, and second, 11 whether the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 12 motion.

And let me address those in turn. First, Your Honor, when a hint of the dispute first arose earlier this year, even we were unclear that it was something ripe to bring to your attention. At first, it appeared that Mega Cable was genuinely confused as to whether RCN Corp.'s bankruptcy had any impact on RCN's indirect investment in the Mexican cable company.

After discussions among the principles in June 2005, Mega Cable's Mexican counsel wrote to me asking for clarification because, in his words, "Mega Cable has been under the assumption that RCN assumed the support and guarantee agreement without ever having been guided otherwise."

This was after confirmation of RCN's plan and Mega
Cable's assumption was the same as RCN's. RCN was standing by

its agreements whatever they may be, and Mega Cable never
 received notice that anything else was happening. That is
 because nothing else did happen.

Fast forward --

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THE COURT: Can I interrupt you for a second? MR. KIRPALANI: Yes.

7 THE COURT: RCN's papers kind of go back and forth, 8 but I did read the one submitted yesterday. Is there an actual 9 agreement that RCN is a party to or is that a fact that still 10 has to be established?

11 MR. KIRPALANI: I think it is a fact that has to be 12 established. These are the facts as I know them to the best of 13 my knowledge, Your Honor.

14 There was a written agreement between a corporation 15 called C-Tech Corp. back in 1997. It was required to get Mega 16 Cable's consent when C-Tech was going to spin off its interests 17 in Mega Cable to RCN's shareholders. As part of those 18 discussions, Mega Cable said we would agree to the spinoff when 19 they signed something so they do, in fact, agree to the spinoff 20 provided that RCN be bound to continue performing the support 21 and guarantee agreement.

After that, no document has been located where RCN
actually did this. This is back in --

24 THE COURT: Where RCN had actually signed saying we
25 were bound by --

MR. KIRPALANI: Actually, with the documents that
 were tendered for signature, whether it was ever prepared,
 nothing.

THE COURT: All right.

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5 MR. KIRPALANI: So, when we went back, talked to 6 Skadden Arps, who was debtors' counsel as the Court knows, went 7 back, looked through the debtors' records, this document just 8 doesn't exist, but we had not known for sure whether Mega Cable 9 actually had the document and just was asking in kind of an 10 obtuse way whatever happened to RCN's obligations.

All we would say is nothing happened to them, what obligations do you mean, whatever they were. RCN International didn't file for bankruptcy, Mega Cable was untouched, and they said, no, that in fact, there was some obligation. We said, fine, if there is some obligation, we'll reaffirm it. There is absolutely no intent, never was, to do anything to Mega Cable.

17 Some time went by, and at some point between June of 18 '05 and the late summer, it appears to us that Mega Cable 19 crafted a new strategy. They didn't assert any longer that it 20 was their assumption that RCN was bound by obligations to Mega 21 Cable because it had never been guided otherwise.

They wrote a letter that says, we've consulted with U.S. bankruptcy counsel, and we now believe that the Chapter 11 plan and the confirmation order in this Court import RCN's obligations because there is an executory contract between RCN

Corp. and Mega Cable, and because the plan was drafted to assume only those contracts that are specifically identified and enumerated, and this one wasn't one of them, even though no one could find it, it must be that it was rejected.

5 Later in the summer, Your Honor, we went back and 6 explained orally and in writing that this is a misreading of 7 what happened in the bankruptcy case and a misunderstanding if 8 anything at all that RCN Corp. clearly did not impair any 9 obligations it may have in respect of its indirect investment 10 in Mega Cable.

As to the executory contract issue, we explained that as I just told the Court, we didn't believe RCN was party to any executory contract with Mega Cable that was even capable of being assumed or rejected. No one at RCN could locate such a document, and our understanding today is nobody at Mega Cable can either because we think they would have attached it to their papers, but it hasn't been stated affirmatively.

In any event, we did explain that RCN Corp. would gladly affirm its obligations that Mega Cable believed it still had because it wanted to continue to protect its investment. It was always that intention. It was a keep part of the asset base of RCN.

Then, on September 2nd, 2005, following a series of discussions between RCN's chairman of the board, Jim Mooney and the chairman of Mega Cable, we received a formal letter from

the same Mexican counsel that had written to me in June saying 1 2 that they had assumed RCN was still bound by its obligations 3 having never been guided otherwise, but now he said that after consulting with U.S. bankruptcy counsel, Mega Cable and the 4 majority stockholders concluded that RCN Corp. was a party to 5 executory contract with Mega Cable. That's the contract that 6 7 no one could locate, and in any event, RCN Corp.'s bankruptcy 8 discharge must have created some legal fiat breach, thereby giving rise to a variety of adverse consequences to RCN. 9

10 Specifically, Your Honor, we attached this because 11 it's really an important document for the Court to consider as 12 Exhibit C to our motion. Mega Cable wrote:

13 "Moreover, whether or not the S&G agreement was 14 executory is ultimately of little consequence to the conclusion 15 reached by Mega Cable and the private shareholders based on the 16 advice of U.S. counsel that RCN terminated its obligations 17 under the agreement in connection with its Chapter 11 18 proceeding."

19 He then went on to say:

20 "Whatever one's analysis of the character of the S&G
21 agreement, the confirmation of RCN's plan of reorganization
22 terminated RCN's obligations under the agreement."

I think the Court understands why at least in our view there was a sudden change of heart. From our perspective, it didn't make sense that there would be a desire to be

1 negatively impacted by a bankruptcy case when the debtor and 2 its creditors never attempted to do that, but the answer I 3 think to that puzzle was stated in the very same letter where 4 counsel to Mega Cable went on to say:

⁵ "Based on the foregoing and the advice of U.S.
⁶ counsel, Mega Cable and the private shareholders have concluded
⁷ that RCN has terminated its obligations, and as a result of
⁸ that, RCN will be left only with residual rights contained in
⁹ the by-laws of Mega Cable."

10 So, in other words, Your Honor, Mega Cable said what 11 we would call, "gotcha."

For years and throughout the Chapter 11 case, the majority shareholders of Mega Cable were to put it mildly uncooperative joint venturers for RCN. During the Chapter 11 case, they persistently refused to provide financial information to RCN.

17 So RCN could not communicate to its creditors exactly 18 how valuable it believed the investment in Mega Cable was. It 19 couldn't properly value it because it didn't have that type of 20 cooperation from the majority stockholders, but that is the 21 nature of doing business, and those issues would never be 22 brought before this Court.

But the dispute that is brought before this Court, Your Honor, I'll get to the heart to it, it is ripe for adjudication. This is an actual case or controversy. The

proper parties are before you, and the arguments center around the two things Mega Cable said in its September 2nd letter: One, did "RCN terminate its obligations under the agreement in connection with its Chapter 11 proceeding?" And, second, is it true that "confirmation of RCN's plan of reorganization terminated RCN's obligations under the agreement."

7 That's a ripe dispute. Unless the Court have any 8 lingering doubt about ripeness, upon seeing that we finally had 9 enough of the letter-writing campaign and that we were going to 10 go to court and ask Your Honor to clarify what happened in this 11 bankruptcy case last year, Mega Cable immediately commenced 12 arbitration proceedings in Paris against RCN's non-debtor 13 subsidiary.

14 It should come as no surprise that the entire 15 predicate of that arbitration dispute is an allegation that the 16 confirmation order of this Court in respect of the debtor, RCN 17 Corp. terminated RCN Corp.'s obligation to Mega Cable allegedly 18 allowing Mega Cable to strip RCN International of minority 19 shareholder protections and compelling RCN International to 20 sell its stake in Mega Cable to the majority shareholders at 21 book value.

All the while, Mega Cable has been continuing to offer to buy out RCN International's investment at less than fair-market value. Mega Cable's motives here are transparent, Your Honor.

This dispute is the highest priority for the board of RCN to resolve and to resolve quickly. We are no longer in the level -- no longer in the realm of wondering if this has risen to the level of an actual controversy. The clock is now ticking on this arbitration against its non-debtor, but here before the Court, we are not asking Your Honor to deal with any aspect of the arbitration.

8 RCN Corp., the debtor before the Court last year and 9 the reorganized debtor today was not even named in the 10 arbitration, Your Honor. This is a dispute between RCN Corp. 11 and a party that allegedly was party to a contract that it 12 believes was impaired and RCN's desire to have this Court 13 clarify that.

The next issue, Your Honor, is the subject matter jurisdiction issue. In my mind, I just keep thinking this is all about bankruptcy, but in order to put it in a little more elegant terms, I'd like to address the concerns that you had about subject matter jurisdiction, the statutory foundations and where that brings us today.

In this regard, it is very important to focus on exactly what RCN Corp., the reorganized debtor is and is not requesting. RCN Corp. is not asking the Court to adjudicate any rights between non-debtor parties. For example, we are not asking the Court to determine whether RCN's subsidiary, RCN International is entitled to minority shareholder protection

regardless of whether RCN Corp. impaired obligations to Mega
 Cable.

3 We are not asking the Court to adjudicate whether Mega Cable has the right to arbitrate the dispute with RCN 4 International. Frankly, as I just said, Your Honor, the 5 6 arbitration is a complete red herring. RCN Corp., the debtor 7 entity is not even a party to the arbitration. Mega Cable 8 wants this Court to be the first in the land to say that it has no jurisdiction to interpret its own orders if the debtors' 9 10 subsidiary is party to an arbitration agreement.

The reason I wanted to walk the Court through the history of the controversy, and I do appreciate the Court's indulgence in that regard, is just to highlight by Mega Cable's own admission what this particular dispute is about. It is entirely about bankruptcy and, more specifically, about what happened in this Court last year.

That brings us to the question of whether it's a core proceeding. It is black-letter law that bankruptcy courts are courts of limited jurisdiction governed by 28 U.S.C. 157, but Mega Cable suggests that the confirmation order motion that we filed is somehow not a core proceeding because its outcome will have no effect on the estate.

This is a nice theory, Your Honor, what the law might be if Mega Cable could have written it to the fit the facts as they happen to appear today, but it's not the law that this

1 Court should follow.

2 Section 157(b)(2) provides a non-exclusive list of 3 core proceedings. Our motion seeks a determination that no obligations to Mega Cable were discharged. This issue, as is 4 clear even from Mega Cable's own letters and its arbitration 5 demand, does not even exist outside of bankruptcy, and 6 7 therefore, "by its nature could only arise in the context of 8 the bankruptcy case." That's In Re Wood, a 5th Circuit case from 1987 that we cited. It makes it core. 9 10 In addition, given that Section 157 is merely an 11 illustrative, non-exclusive list, we must fall back to the 12 basics of a court's inherent power. Bankruptcy courts "have

13 core jurisdiction to interpret and enforce their own orders." 14 The cite for that is <u>Cox against Zale Delaware</u>, a 7th Circuit 15 case, and a 2nd Circuit case, <u>In Re Petrie Retail</u>.

The 7th Circuit case, Your Honor, in Cox against Zale 16 17 is very instructive on the issue of jurisdiction. There, a 18 former debtor sought to sue Zale Jewelers not one, but several 19 years after confirmation of his plan on the grounds that post-20 consummation, the reorganized debtor kept paying Zale under a 21 reaffirmation agreement that was never filed with the 22 Bankruptcy Court. He wanted to keep this ring, and he wanted 23 to continue paying for it, but the reaffirmation agreement was 24 never filed and the bankruptcy confirmation order said if it's 25 not excluded, it is a discharged obligation.

The reorganized debtor several years later said hey, that debt was discharged by the confirmation order so it should not have kept paying, and Zale should not have kept being asked to be paid.

5 The 7th Circuit said more than anything, this is a 6 core bankruptcy matter. It made no difference that years had 7 elapsed and that the estate was fully administered. It made no 8 difference that the amount involved was about \$200 and would 9 have no impact on administering any estate.

10 The Court's focus was simple and clear and stems from 11 the statute: Does this dispute arise from the Bankruptcy 12 Court's confirmation order discharging debts? Is there an 13 issue of whether this debt was discharged or not?

14 That was enough for the 7th Circuit, and we submit it 15 is enough for this matter as well.

Even the 2nd Circuit has had occasion to hold, Your Honor, that proceedings can be core if one of two things exist: One, the cause of action is "uniquely affected by the bankruptcy proceedings, or two, it directly affects a core bankruptcy function." That's the <u>Petrie Retail</u> case.

In <u>Petrie</u>, Your Honor, Judge Gonzales exercised postconfirmation jurisdiction and this was affirmed all the way up to the 2nd Circuit. The facts were as simple as they are here. The respondent was a landlord who sought rent payments in the bankruptcy and then sought its debts to be considered, 1 "excluded liabilities" in the Bankruptcy Court sale order.

2 The dispute was clearly between only the landlord and3 the purchaser. The debtor didn't have any role in the dispute.

The respondent said the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because this was a dispute for another court, it having no bearing on the administration of the estate, but the second circuit thought about these issues quite differently in a quite similar way to the 7th Circuit. It held:

9 "A bankruptcy court retains post-confirmation 10 jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own orders, 11 particularly when disputes arise over a bankruptcy plan of 12 reorganization."

13 Under this authority, Your Honor, and the numerous other cases cited in our reply, RCN submits that this Court 14 15 absolutely has subject matter jurisdiction to interpret and enforce and perhaps clarify its own confirmation order. 16 This 17 is true regardless of whether the dispute centers upon whether 18 the S&G agreement was an executory contract that was rejected 19 or assumed, or as Mega Cable puts it, even if the agreement was 20 not executory, did the confirmation order discharge obligations 21 to Mega Cable.

This is at the heart of the dispute which for today's purposes subject matter jurisdiction is the most important thing to keep in mind. What is at issue? Executory contract, rejection and discharge. There are no other issues. Those are

1 core issues. How can they not be, Your Honor.

The final issue that I wanted to just address was an issue raised in the papers relating to Section 1127(b). It appears that Mega Cable has taken the position that Section 117(b) occupies the field of how and when a debtor can seek relief from a confirmation order.

7 What does the statute say? The statute says that the 8 debtor can modify a plan at any time after confirmation and 9 before substantial consummation, but the modified plan only 10 becomes the plan if circumstances warrant and the Court holds 11 another confirmation hearing. By its terms, this statute has 12 nothing to do with the Rule 60(b) relief sought here.

We are not seeking a modification of the plan that creditors voted on. We are seeking to uphold it. We would like an opportunity to present evidence that that's the case.

16 Even if Your Honor were to accept Mega Cable's 17 position that the plan clearly rejected or clearly discharged 18 obligations owing to Mega Cable, we think, Your Honor, that the 19 only issues that relate to Mega Cable are not issues that 20 relate at all to the plan's core distribution functions, and 21 the case law is clear that 1127(b) to the extent it occupies 22 the field, it occupies the field of distributions to creditors 23 upsetting the debtor/creditor restructuring that was at the 24 heart of a plan not, Your Honor, in a situation where taking 25 the first example about the executory contract or not, it was a

mere permissive use of 1123(b)(2) that the plan is what
 affected the assumption and rejection of contracts.

As the Court well knows, Section 365 is what operates in that world, and even 1123(b)(2) makes reference to Section 5 365. It says subject to Section 365. Subject to what, the 6 requirements or also the privileges and the benefits including 7 the right to invoke 60(b). We think it's everything, Your 8 Honor.

9 Numerous cases exist allowing 60(b) relief in the
10 context of Section 365 orders. Just to give a few, Your Honor,
11 <u>In Re Muma Services</u>, which is 279 BR 478. It's a bankruptcy
12 case from the District of Delaware, and even right here in New
13 York, <u>In Re Wills Motors</u>, 133 BR. 303.

The issue, Your Honor, is does Rule 60(b) provide an avenue of relief when there is something that requires clarification, something that perhaps didn't go as planned. We don't believe 1127(b) forecloses that, Your Honor, and we believe there are cases to support that position.

For example, in <u>401 East 89th Street</u>, it's a Judge Brozman decision here in the Southern District from 1998, the creditor successfully moved under Rule 60(b) to modify a confirmed and consummated plan, and there, it was much more earthshattering in terms of what happened to the plan.

There, a creditor, I believe it was actually ashareholder, indicated in the coop that he failed to redeem his

1 shares and tender the required consideration. As a result, the 2 plan canceled those equity interests, and the purchaser or the 3 sponsor of the plan had to provide additional consideration and 4 buy up those interests.

5 That equity holder came back and said under Rule 6 60(b), I made a mistake, I didn't understand something, I 7 didn't see something, can we have that clarified. It was 8 clearly substantially consummated, but Judge Brozman said Rule 9 60(b) notwithstanding the finality of an order of confirmation 10 can be invoked, especially, Your Honor, where the equities 11 support that.

12 In that case, Judge Brozman noted that if she didn't 13 grant the 60(b) relief, the equity holder would have forfeited 14 the value of his shares. It's a very similar situation here, 15 Your Honor.

16 There are other cases, but I think, Your Honor, I 17 would save the rest of my remarks for reply.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TEITELBAUM: Where to start. Perhaps maybe I'll -- I have prepared remarks, Your Honor, but let me perhaps while these citations are a little bit fresh in your mind address a couple of them because I think it does go to the heart of why we're here.

24 Many of Mr. Kirpalani's preliminary remarks regarding 25 motives and "gotcha," quite frankly, they're irrelevant. What

we have here today is this Court is faced with a plan which was confirmed a year ago which by the debtors' admissions has been substantially consummated. All of the stock has been distributed. All of the claims, all of the distributions and claims have been made save approximately one percent -- there's some claims objections. There's nothing left to implement in connection with this plan.

8 So let me just jump ahead a little bit. So how is it 9 possible that this Court has jurisdiction over a dispute 10 between two non-debtors involving a contract between those non-11 debtors involving an arbitration between those non-debtors 12 where my clients don't have a claim in this -- never filed a 13 claim in the bankruptcy case, never appeared in the bankruptcy 14 case, never a participant in the bankruptcy case.

Now, Mr. Kirpalani's thesis here is basically that anytime this Court issues an order in a core proceeding, any followup to that order has got to be necessarily core, and he cited a few cases to Your Honor both in his brief and today for that -- for that proposition. There's a problem with that, however. It's not the case. It's not the law.

This Court is not -- and I don't think it would want to be -- the perpetual guardian of every debtor that ever leaves its court to protect and preserve that debtor in the day-to-day business affairs that it must engage once confirmation has taken plan.

Now let me just by way of example talk about a couple
 of the cases and then I'll come back to some other remarks.

With respect to Judge Brozman's decision in <u>401 East</u> <u>89th</u>, that's a good example of perhaps reading too much into a case and perhaps bad cases making not terrific law which is there was nothing in that case that reflected the plan was substantially consummated. Absolutely nothing.

8 More importantly, in that case, the reason Judge 9 Brozman reached out was not because of some potential default 10 or forfeiture by a creditor. What happened in that case was 11 the judge found that the debtors on at least three or four 12 separate occasions failed to provide notice to that creditor of 13 notice of a bar date, notice of a termination of its interests 14 and notice of another hearing.

That debtor by virtue of its own conduct was going to create the default on behalf of that creditor. That creditor came in and said, Your Honor, this isn't right. I didn't get notice, how can I be bound by this?

19 THE COURT: Aren't only debtors held to that 20 standard?

21 MR. TEITELBAUM: Well, but -- but no, Your Honor. 22 But the point is here, it's different. Here, the debtors made 23 some very affirmative decisions in their case, and they want to 24 be relieved of that.

25

THE COURT: Well, what does the disclosure say about

1 this relationship?

2	MR. TEITELBAUM: The disclosure statement says only		
3	that there is an interest in Mega Cable of approximately 49		
4	percent and that that in the valuation, there's a reference		
5	to the fact that the debtors have included that in their in		
6	their valuation, but there is no attribution of dollar amount,		
7	and that's it. And that's, by the way, in footnotes, Your		
8	Honor.		
9	But, more importantly, what does the disclosure		
10	statement say about the relationship between my client, Mega		
11	Cable and RCN? Nothing.		
12	THE COURT: What is their relationship?		
13	MR. TEITELBAUM: Well, Your Honor		
14	THE COURT: Isn't it time to actually say whether		
15	there's a contract or not?		
16	MR. TEITELBAUM: We don't you know, we were		
17	THE COURT: I want to know that question. I don't		
18	want to spend a lot of time on this if there's no agreement		
19	because that would be just ridiculous.		
20	MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, I		
21	THE COURT: Is there an agreement?		
22	MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, I came in here to ask a		
23	question of Mr. Kirpalani, because I was confused by his		
24	papers, because it flip-flopped.		
25	THE COURT: Well, I know.		

22 MR. TEITELBAUM: We don't have a written agreement. 1 2 We do not have a written agreement. 3 THE COURT: Okav. MR. TEITELBAUM: We're perfectly happy to say we 4 5 don't have an agreement, and therefore, we should not even be 6 here. I am perfectly happy to deal with that and let the 7 arbitrators figure out what all that means. 8 THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. There's no written 9 agreement and you're asserting in an arbitration that there was 10 a breach of this agreement? 11 MR. TEITELBAUM: What we're saying, Your Honor --12 what we are currently saying in our arbitration because of the 13 representations made to us previously by -- by the debtors that 14 there was some -- there was some agreement. We didn't have a 15 writing. We asked -- we had asked RCN to confirm in writing 16 this assumption. It was never done. 17 They have now taken the position --18 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. You asked them to 19 confirm in writing what? 20 MR. TEITELBAUM: That the corporate reorganization 21 from C-Tech where -- to RCN --22 THE COURT: Right. 23 MR. TEITELBAUM: -- resulted in an assumption of the 24 underlying obligations in connection with the support and 25 guarantee agreement was between Mega Cable and C-Tech.

THE COURT: And is that -- is that the correspondence 1 2 that's attached as exhibit to the RCN motion? 3 MR. TEITELBAUM: No, I don't believe that is the -that is that correspondence. That -- but that agreement was 4 5 never executed, Your Honor. THE COURT: So there's no agreement. 6 7 MR. TEITELBAUM: There is no agreement. 8 THE COURT: So how -- so how can -- how can the 9 provision of the plan providing for rejection of executory 10 contracts be at all pertinent? 11 MR. TEITELBAUM: How can the bankruptcy be at all 12 relevant to a -- to a relationship that doesn't exist is our 13 question. 14 THE COURT: Well, no, wait a minute. You're -- I assume, I don't have the pleadings, but I assume your client 15 16 not -- yes, I assume your client has commenced an arbitration 17 in Paris asserting that the rejection under the confirmation 18 order of an agreement between RCN and your client has resulted 19 in a breach of the agreement between your client and the RCN 20 entity, non-debtor entity that's a part of that arbitration. 21 Isn't that what the arbitration complaint says? MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, that is one of the 22 23 claims --24 THE COURT: Well, how can you say that? 25 MR. TEITELBAUM: Well, Your Honor, that is -- that

1 was one of the claims because we were under the impression that 2 the debtors were operating under the support and guarantee 3 agreement. The debtors have said we don't have an agreement 4 with you, and so therefore, Your Honor, we're going -- we can 5 very readily say in front of the arbitrators you need to assess 6 under the separate shareholder and subscription agreements that 7 are between the non-debtor parties --

8 THE COURT: Well, so wait, wait. So do you concede 9 that? I mean, it sounds to me that what you're saying is that 10 the reason there's no jurisdiction here is that the plan 11 confirmation order, which provides for rejection of contracts, 12 is wholly irrelevant because there was no rejection of a 13 contract.

MR. TEITELBAUM: We are saying that and, Your Honor, when we were -- when we read the initial pleading from RCN in which they purported that there was -- they alleged that there was an agreement.

18 THE COURT: Well no, they didn't say that.

19 MR. TEITELBAUM: Well Your Honor --

20 THE COURT: They said that you have alleged that 21 there was an agreement.

22 MR. TEITELBAUM: Actually --

THE COURT: That's why I thought -- that's one of the reasons I wondered whether this was ripe is because someone was hiding the ball.

MR. TEITELBAUM: Well no, actually, Your Honor, in
 Paragraph 5 of the initial motion, RCN alleges in any case RCN
 --

4 THE COURT: Yes, in any case. In any case. Even if 5 there is such an agreement, in any case, this is X, Y and Z.

6 MR. TEITELBAUM: Well, they alleged that they had 7 been performing their obligations.

8 THE COURT: Well, that's the next part I have for 9 you, which is you say -- first you say there's no agreement, 10 then you say that they've breached whatever agreement there is, 11 and they say, no, we're performing this non-agreement.

MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, I'm not sure that, first of all, that it really matters because under either scenario, if we assume there is agreement or isn't an agreement, there still is no jurisdiction as we've addressed in our papers and -

17 THE COURT: Well, there's clearly no jurisdiction if 18 the -- if the alleged harm that -- or the alleged controversy 19 that RCN is trying to have determined doesn't exist because the 20 whole thing is made out of whole cloth. I understand that 21 point, but you're saying there's no jurisdiction for me to even 22 -- you're just saying I shouldn't even opine on that, that 23 basically the arbitrators can figure that out on their own and 24 that this whole thing has been a colossal waste of money and 25 they probably have enormous shareholder rights against you,

26 your client for raising this whole thing in the first place 1 2 over a non-existent agreement. 3 MR. TEITELBAUM: No, Your Honor --THE COURT: I mean, I've never heard of such a thing. 4 5 That's outrageous. 6 MR. TEITELBAUM: We're not saying that at all, Your 7 Honor. 8 THE COURT: Well, I hope not. What are you saying? 9 MR. TEITELBAUM: We're not saying that at all. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor, the parties were 12 proceeding up until we received the reply last night on the 13 assumption that the restructuring from C-Tech to RCN resulted 14 in a transfer of the obligations that C-Tech had under the 15 support and guarantee agreement to RCN. 16 The parties were proceeding along those lines until 17 we received papers yesterday that said, essentially, we don't 18 have an agreement, we can't find the writing; we're not bound. 19 THE COURT: Well, when you say "the parties were proceeding that way," isn't that all initiated by the fact of 20 21 your client saying there was an agreement? 22 MR. TEITELBAUM: We --23 THE COURT: Isn't that just a fraud to say that? 24 MR. TEITELBAUM: No, it -- I don't believe it is, 25 Your Honor, at all --

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THE COURT: Why not? Why not?

MR. TEITELBAUM: Because -- because by --

3 THE COURT: I mean, they should know what their 4 agreements are before they say we have an agreement.

MR. TEITELBAUM: As a matter of --

6 THE COURT: I'm going to take a recess. I'd like to 7 think about this before you proceed. I'm shocked by this.

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MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor --

9 THE COURT: I'm going to adjourn this hearing for --10 until the 22nd of December, and I'd like you to reflect on your 11 client's position in this matter. I'll give you my preliminary 12 ruling on jurisdiction, but I think this goes way beyond that. 13 I think this goes to Rule 11.

I'm shocked by this, that you would -- you would put me and this Court to deciding an issue when the underlying facts as asserted to your client are made up out of whole cloth.

18 MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor --

19 THE COURT: To assert that there was an agreement 20 because the parties were thinking there was agreement when the 21 basis of one party thinking that is your client's assertion 22 that there was one. I can't believe that.

And I'll tell you one thing, if I have core jurisdiction, one of the things that I have core jurisdiction on is to decide whether there's an executory contract or not

covered by my order, and I have a good idea how I'm going to decide that issue. So I'm going to adjourn this until the 22nd at ten o'clock. MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor --THE COURT: I don't want to hear anymore. I'm just amazed that the responsible corporation with responsible counsel would take this position. MR. TEITELBAUM: Your Honor --THE COURT: That's it. Think about it. MR. TEITELBAUM: Thank you. * *

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1	I certify that the foregoing is a court transcript from an
2	electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-
3	entitled matter.
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6	Kathleen Price, CET
7	Dated: December 20, 2005
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